tl;dr
Cryptocurrency exchange Garantex Europe, sanctioned by the US Treasury’s OFAC for laundering illicit funds linked to ransomware and darknet markets, anticipated enforcement actions and implemented contingency plans. Despite a March 2025 takedown of Garantex's infrastructure, its successor platform G...
Cryptocurrency exchange Garantex Europe, recently sanctioned by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), may have anticipated these actions and already put contingency plans in place, according to blockchain intelligence firm TRM Labs. Despite a second round of sanctions against Garantex and its successor platform Grinex, TRM Labs reports that the impact might be circumvented as these entities appear to swiftly migrate clients, infrastructure, and funds to successor platforms to evade enforcement measures.
Garantex had been a significant hub used by ransomware groups for laundering illicit gains, facilitating darknet market transactions, and moving other illegal funds. The OFAC estimates that billions of dollars in crypto transactions moved through Garantex between 2019 and March 2025. Although US, German, and Finnish authorities dismantled Garantex’s infrastructure in March 2025, evidence from Kyrgyz government records shows that Grinex was incorporated months earlier, in December 2024, preparing to take over operations.
Further signaling preemptive moves, wallets linked to Garantex started transferring funds into the Russian ruble-pegged stablecoin A7A5 in January 2025, weeks ahead of the official crackdown. This maneuver highlights insider knowledge of enforcement actions and a strategic attempt to create a sanctions-resistant transfer channel. TRM Labs estimates that Garantex processed over $100 million in illicit transactions before its initial sanctioning in 2022, with hundreds of millions more afterward.
Following the March 2025 takedown, Garantex’s operators swiftly put contingency plans into effect, promoting Grinex through Telegram channels as a familiar alternative platform. Additionally, another exchange, Meer, which launched around the same time as Grinex and the A7A5 token in December 2024, resembles Garantex and Grinex in features and trading interface. This simultaneous launch suggests coordinated planning, with Meer’s trading volume spiking post-enforcement, appearing to sustain illicit fund flows within the network.
The A7A5 token played a central role in facilitating the migration of frozen customer funds from Garantex to Grinex. TRM Labs identifies the Garantex-Grinex-A7A5 connection as a critical example in understanding how illicit activities evolve and migrate. The case calls for heightened due diligence toward fiat-pegged tokens with opaque governance, as such tokens can be repurposed into essential components of sanctions evasion when linked to complex corporate networks and sanctioned institutions.